Polonia

Estudios
Latinoamericanos

Sociedad Polaca de Estudios Latinoamericanos

ISSN 0137-3080

Original title / título original: *The mysterious death of Manqu Inqa, ruler of Vilcabamba: on whose orders were the assassins acting?*

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Published originally as/ Publicado originalmente en:

Estudios Latinoamericanos, 33/34 (2013-2014), pp. 151-168

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.36447/Estudios2014.v33-34.art6>

Estudios Latinoamericanos is a journal published by Polish Society for Latin American Studies (Polskie Towarzystwo Studiów Latynoamerykanistycznych).

Polish Society for Latin American Studies is scholarly organization established to facilitate research on Latin America and to encourage and promote scientific and cultural cooperation between Poland and Latin America.

Estudios Latinoamericanos, revista publicada por la Sociedad Polaca de Estudios Latinoamericanos (Polskie Towarzystwo Studiów Latynoamerykanistycznych).

Sociedad Polaca de Estudios Latinoamericanos es una asociación científica fundada con el fin de desarrollar investigaciones científicas sobre América Latina y participar en la cooperación científica y cultural entre las sociedades de Polonia y América Latina.

The mysterious death of Manqu Inca, ruler of Vilcabamba: on whose orders were the assassins acting?¹

Mariusz Ziółkowski

Abstract

Manqu Inca (Manco Inca), the ruler of the neo-inca Vilcabamba state, was assassinated in the second half of 1544 or in the beginning of 1545 by seven Spaniards, almagrists, led by Diego Méndez. But a question arise: who was the prime instigator and the architect of the crime?

Palabras clave: Manqu Inca (Manco Inca), Pawllu Inca (Inca Paullo), Spanish conquest, Vilcabamba, history of Peru.

Resumen

LA MISTERIOSA MUERTE DE MANQU INCA, SOBERANO DE VILCABAMBA: ¿BAJO LAS ÓRDENES DE QUIEN ACTUARON LOS ASESINOS?

Manqu Inca (Manco Inca), soberano del estado neo-inca de Vilcabamba, fue asesinado en la segunda mitad de 1544 o a inicios de 1545 por siete españoles, almagristas, encabezados por Diego Méndez. Sin embargo surge una pregunta: ¿quién fue el artífice del crimen?

Key words: Manqu Inca (Manco Inca), Pawllu Inca (Inca Paullo), conquista española, Vilcabamba, historia del Perú.

What is so mysterious about it, one may ask? After all, the event has been described in numerous sources, including the one by a witness, Titu Kusi Yupanki², son of Manqu Inca, who accompanied his father on that unfortunate day:

«It has already been many days and years, and the Spaniards stayed with my father in the town of Vitcos, in his house. One day, we were happily playing the ring, and there were only they, my father and I, just an adolescent boy, my father

did not think evil of them nor did he believe a certain Indian woman belonging to one of them called Bauba, who said she heard that these Spaniards wanted to kill him. Not suspecting them of this or of anything else, he partook with them as before, while they played the ring, as I have already said, and my father went to lift it, they fell on him, all with their daggers and knives, and swords; and my father, feeling wounded, furiously tried to defend himself against attacks from both sides; but he was one, and they were seven, and he did not have any weapons with him, he finally fell to the ground having been severely wounded, and they left him for dead. I was still very small, and when I saw what happened to my father, I wanted to go to him and protect him; then they turned against me, greatly angered, aiming at me with the spear belonging to my father, which happened to be there, and it wouldn't have taken much for them to kill me too. And I, scared, terrified by all I have seen, run away, down through the forest, so that they could not find me, even if they were looking for me; and they, leaving my father in agony, stood much elated in the doorway, saying: "We have killed an Inca; you have nothing to fear". At that, several Andes who had just arrived, and captain Rimachi Yupanki arrested them before they managed to escape too far, blocking their retreat, threw them off their horses and dragged them away to be sacrificed. And all were handed a cruel death, and some were burned» (Titu Cusi 1989: 108-109).

As to the circumstances of the plot and the conspirators, all these sources agree - the killers were seven Spaniards, *almagristas*³, led by Diego Mendez. Although there are some differences in the reports, for example, as to whether Manqu Inca died on the spot or, as claimed by Titu Yupanki, he lived for several days (Titu Cusi 1989, 1992 [1570]), there is no such controversy concerning the fate of the plotters - even decades later, in May 1565, the Spanish emissary Diego Rodriguez de Figueroa was shown their skulls:

«(...) I walked through Vidcos, where the Inca was killed by seven Spaniards; and to this day their heads are displayed» (Rodríguez de Figueroa 1910 [1565]: 97).

It should be mentioned, that all of them perished before they could answer a crucial question: why was it at this moment, after two years of living under his care, that they decided to attack him?

If this was not «a crime of passion», caused by a disagreement during the course of the game (which is hard to believe, though such an explanation was presented⁴), but an act of premeditation, then from whom were the perpetrators expecting a reward (an of what kind), had they been able to escape and reach the area controlled by the Spaniards? The motive most often suggested by researchers was

instigation on the part of Gonzalo Pizarro and/or Alonso de Toro, his deputy in Cuzco⁵. Another (perhaps significantly less likely) possibility would be the desire to gain the favors of Vice-king Blasco Núñez Vela and obtain pardon for their involvement in the Diego de Almagro «El Mozo» rebellion.

Both of these explanations, however, do not take into account the aspect of timing: if we are to believe the information obtained by Juan de Betanzos, Gonzalo Pizarro had not been in Cuzco for a long time (see further), when the attack took place, it is not clear either how this could have gained the confidence of their declared enemies, the almagrists. And this, what's more, in an uncertain and changeable political situation like the one that existed in Peru at the time. On the other

Figure 1. Assassination of Manqu Inca by Diego Mendez, according to Fray Martín de Murúa (based on Codex Galvin).

Figure 2. Don Cristobal Pawllu Inkill Tupa Inqa, in a 19 c. drawing (Justo Apu Sahuaraura «Recuerdos de la monarquía peruana: O bosquejo de la historia de los Incas, compendio breve» 1838/1850).

hand, acting in order to gain the favors of Vice-king Blasco Nuñez Vela does not look too convincing, since, if we are, again, to believe the Betanzos informants, it was well known in Vilcabamba that the viceroy is coming to enforce the so-called «New Rights for Indians», very favorable for the latter. Manqu Inqa was to have even sent Diego Mendez as his emissary to the Vice-king⁶.

Moreover, commonly known legal problems, which the brothers Pizarro incurred for the decision to execute Ataw Wallpa clearly indicated that the administration of His Royal Highness (and he himself) did not favorably look upon a situation in which the subjects make attempts on the lives of the rulers, even pagan ones –

Figure 3. Map showing the route of penetration of the Collasuyu area by the Spaniards in the years 1535-1539. It is noteworthy, that both Diego de Almagro el Viejo and later the brothers Gonzalo and Hernando Pizarro, crossed close to silver mines in Potosi, well known to the Indians, yet none revealed the secret to the Spaniards at the time (map by Tristan Platt *et al.* 2006).

such regrettable events, as the one with Ataw Wallpa, could, after all, serve as a bad example, not to say, an incentive for imitators. And this not necessarily in the area of the New World.

And one more thing - not the viceroy, residing then in Lima, nor anyone from his entourage had the opportunity to send a messenger with a letter to Vilcabamba. And this was the real detonator of the entire conspiracy:

«A Métis arrived from Cuzco, supposedly fleeing from Christians in Cuzco (i.e. supporters of Gonzalo Pizarro – the Author) in order to serve Manqu Inca and he brought with him a letter of unknown origin from someone in Cuzco, which he handed secretly to Diego Mendez, in this letter (the sender) said something that would be beneficial to the one who received it. The Inca, seeing how ragged (this) Métis was, commanded him to be clad in velvet and given all he desired and to remain in the company of Diego Mendez. And when the Métis was alone with Diego Mendez, he told him in words what it was about, and Diego Mendez at the time had a Negro woman, and she heard what the Métis told her master and saw him with the letter in his hand. Diego Mendez met with Gómez Perez and the other Spaniards and he told them what was in the letter and what the Métis told him and they (made) the decision to kill the Inca and they commanded the baking of many buns⁷ so that they would have something to eat as they made their escape, and having found this out (this) Negro woman⁸ went to tell the Inca dignitaries. When they heard this, they went to tell the Inca and because the Inca was very fond of the Spaniards and so loved them (...) he told (the dignitaries) do not come before me saying such things anymore or I will punish you (...)» (Betanzos 1987 [1551]: pt. II, chapter 32, 303).

It is very puzzling that the Inca, a politician with dozens of years' experience in contacts with the Spaniards, who has often displayed far-reaching distrust and caution in dealing with them, this time so carelessly approached these warnings. He must have been very sure of his position, to so badly assess the situation. The fact is Luck seemed to be on his side - after the departure of Gonzalo Pizarro, Cuzco was almost defenseless and the Inca decided to use this moment to take it over. By the way, he was persuaded to do so by the same Métis - messenger - it was clearly a matter of moving the Inca troops out of Vilcabamba and leaving the Inca with a small escort:

«On the day after the Spaniards held their conference, the Inca ordered the Métis before him and privately made him tell what was happening in Cuzco and who was the commander there and what Spaniards were with him and how many horses there were. The Métis told him, the commander in Cuzco

was Toro and there were no more than fifty men and they had no horses (...) because they were all taken by Gonzalo Pizarro (...) and these people, who were in Cuzco were doing nothing and were quite carefree and it seemed to the Inca that the Métis was saying the truth and he sent him back to his quarters. Then he commanded his captains to be brought before him and he told them what the Métis said, and that it seemed to him, that they have time to go to Cuzco and kill the Spaniards, that they would find there and take everything that they could and to bring back (here) all the Spanish women they could find, and the captains said that they would like to go (to Cuzco). The Inca said that they all had to go on this expedition and that their commander is to be Pumasupa and so (they) have prepared and set out on the expedition and to guard the Inca, ten Andich Indians were left, those that eat human flesh, and fifty others, with Tumbaysi as their captain (...).

Since the Spaniards wanted to kill the Inca, it seemed to them that now was the time, because the army and the captains headed for Cuzco (...)» (Betanzos 1987 [1551] 302).

And this is what happened, with well-known consequences for the conspirators. News of the death of the Inca, transmitted secretly to the Inca leaders, forced them to return immediately, as they feared (rightly so), that if this rumor was spread prematurely, the fighters would feel freed from obedience and would simply return home:

«Tumbaysi sent two Indians to Pumasupa through whom he requested him to come back as the Inca was dead (...) and when (the captains and army) come back, you have to decide what has to be done (...); the messengers found Pumasupa who was (already) in the Limatambo mountains, which is seven leguas⁹ from Cuzco, (...) and they came to Pumasupa secretly and they told him privately about what happened, and Pumasupa returned (from this meeting) telling his people, that the Inca is calling them (to him), and so he said (...) that people would not flee, for if they knew of the death of the Inca, they would all flee and also (...) they could kill him (Pumasupa) on this same occasion (...); returning to the place where Manqu Inca was killed, Pumasupa and the other captains gathered and together chose Inca and the son of a certain Manqu Inca, who was ten years old, and they called him Sayri Tupa Yupanki and after they did that, they began their mourning and sacrifices because of the death of Inca and after (passage of) a year they gave him a puru qaya feast¹⁰ and they buried his body and they made a bundle of his fingernails and hair, cut during his life, just as the bundles made for his ancestors. (...)» (Betanzos 1987 [1551]: pt. II, chapter 33, 307)

Thus the secret death plot served two purposes - to eliminate the head of the state of Vilcabamba, leaving it temporarily without a successor capable of taking effective authority (Sayri Tupa Yupanki was 10 years old, and the other Manqu Inca sons were also still minors), and to save Cuzco at the same time. A masterstroke by someone, indeed. What's more, the perpetrators themselves were no longer in a position to say who inspired them. Let us speculate some more, however, and consider, who it could have been or at least, from what circle. And who benefited the most (Sarmiento de Gamboa 1965 [1572]; Santos Escobar 1987; Regalado de Hurtado 1997; Medinaceli 2007).

So let's go back to the letter and the Métis messenger: as we already mentioned, it could not have been sent by viceroy Blasco Nuñez Vela or Gonzalo Pizarro, because both were on the Coast. And probably nobody from their surroundings - the question of time contradicts it, because although a precise date of Manqu Inca's death is a subject of dispute, it seems most likely that it took place sometime between August and November 1544¹¹.

It is difficult to suspect the Cuzco City Council (Cabildo) of such a Machiavellian conspiracy, all the more so since, as mentioned above, the councilors would have to take into account the significant consequences from his majesty Charles I. The more so, since the envoy, viceroy Blasco Nuñez Vela, arrived as an emissary of «policy of reconciliation» with the Inca. In conclusion, the idea of the assassination of the Inca could not have originated in any of the Spanish authority centers: certainly not among the royalists, nor the pizarrists¹², nor, obviously, in the ecclesiastical circles.

Rather, it had to be a «private initiative» by some wealthy and influential person. Someone familiar with the Vilcabamba court's internal situation and who could dispatch their «man» there.

Someone who could count on the trust of the almagrists staying there. Someone who was able to offer assistance in obtaining amnesty for participation in the Diego de Almagro «El Mozo» rebellion¹³. Someone who considered an assassination attempt on the life of a leader (may we add – even if it was his own close relative...) as a normal tool in the fight for power (by the way, Manqu Inca himself had similar views on the matter and practice, as shown in another place). And who feared that Manqu Inca would become, again, a desirable partner for the representatives of Spanish Crown to discuss a settlement.

Although this is all speculation, these reasons point to one, very specific suspect: Don Cristobal Pawllu Inkill Tupa Inca.

Pawllu Inca was at the time the only, outside Manqu Inca, living son of Wayna Qhapaqa, who held a position enabling him to act as heir of the Tawantin Suyu rulers. Moreover, he was considered as such by the Inca aristocracy, and in his time, although briefly, held the title of Zapay Inca given to him with the consent and support of Diego de Almagro «El Viejo». Also following the change

in the alliance, during the new political order, he persistently sought the title, supported in his efforts by bishop Fray Vicente de Valverde, who wrote to the king in March 1539:

«(...) all we need now is a certain son of Wayna Qhapaqa called Pawllu, who is considered to be their lord by the Indians of this land who are peaceful and on our side»¹⁴.

It is worth noting, that the saintly Bishop was not bothered that this faithful ally of the Spanish was at the time (and until 1543) still a pagan and what's more, in his Colcampata palace in the middle of Cuzco, with the participation of Inca aristocracy, he carried out traditional feasts, including the Intip Raymin, in front of the statue of Wana Kawri. Well, politics has its laws, before which even the most ardent missionary zeal must cede...

In following years, Pawllu Inca's position rose further, he received from the Crown great land deeds and numerous privileges, and finally decided to make the final step demonstrating his loyalty: he decided to be baptized. This took place in 1543, Pawllu Inca took the name Cristobál and his godfather was none other than the royal governor of Peru, Don Cristobál Vaca de Castro. Numerous members of the Inca nobility followed his lead¹⁵.

This action, although certainly strengthening Pawllu Inca's position vis-à-vis the Spaniards, paradoxically, also increased Manqu Inca's prestige among the masses:

«The Indians, who survived the skirmishes and battles (...) fled to the Andes (the jungle) to serve Manqu Inca (...) whom they consider to be their main master, and not Don Cristobál Inca, because (the latter) was always a friend of the Christians and accompanied them and (also) because he was baptized» (Gutiérrez de Santa Clara 1963: pt. III, chapter 55, 19, 230).

Manqu Inca was, therefore, Pawllu Inca's only obstacle on the way to becoming the representative of the entire Inca community before the Spanish Crown - his death, after all, should have led to the fall of the Vilcabamba state, or at least to create the conditions needed to obtain control over it by Pawllu Inca himself. And, perhaps, to allow him to play his last, royal hand: disclosing the location of ultra rich (and until now unknown to the Spanish) silver mines in Potosí.

1. Sun mines

In the late 1544 and 1545, when the tragic events in Vilcabamba were taking place, the Spaniards did not know of the mines in Potosí¹⁶ on the Qulla Suyu

territory (now Bolivia), although they have been exercising de facto control over this part of Tawantin Suyu for over five years. In less than a hundred years, the silver deposits at Potosi will be widely known in the whole of Europe, and the town of Potosi itself, located at an altitude of 4000 m. in cold and inhospitable puna, will number approximately 160-thousand inhabitants by 1610, making it at the time the largest city in the Americas and one of the largest in Christian world. And if we were to look for the beginnings of «the global economic system», it is undoubtedly the silver from Potosi that had a far-reaching impact on the economy of contemporary Europe and America.

But in 1544, it was still the future. Information about the mines was a highly guarded secret by the Indians, sanctioned with religious prohibitions. Precious metal deposits were in fact treated as wak'a, holy sites imbued with great power, and the metal from particularly rich mines was intended for decorating the temples of the highest imperial deities, including the Sun.

It was believed that revealing the mines to the Bearded Ones would be an act of sacrilege, which would bring punishment not only upon the perpetrators but the entire population.

This conviction is well-illustrated by the case of the silver ore in Tarapacá, on the terrain of today's northern Chile, which may be worth recalling:

«Finding out about the silver (...), Lucas Martínez threatened the local chieftains from his encomienda in Tarapacá, saying he shall slay them for not pointing out the mine to him (...). The chieftains, believing that Lucas Martínez would do so, told him not to fret, because they would show him the Sun mine, with its white silver deposit (...), and that they did not dare divulge it to him earlier, because their witches said they will all die and their harvest will perish if they reveal it» (Pizarro 1917 [1571]: 137-138).

As we recall, despite the promise made to Lucas Martinez, the afore-mentioned «chieftains», frightened by the solar eclipse which occurred at the time over northern Chile, finally decided not to disclose the location of the mine to the Spanish¹⁷. In fact, at that time, only an authority such as Zapay Inca or at least a high ranking Inca religious representative could, in a case of this kind, convince the Indians to divulge a secret guarded by such dire repercussions. The necessity of obtaining consent from a religious supervisor was a simple consequence of accountability of the local wak' to imperial deities. Let's take a closer look at this mechanism, using as example the above-mentioned historical events of 1539: handing of the silver mine in Porco over to the Spaniards¹⁸.

As noted earlier, it took place following the battle at Cochabamba, where Gonzalo Pizarro and Pawllu Inca, leading the Spanish and Indian troops, defeated the army of Manqu Inca composed of Qulla suyu people, including the Charka confederation.

Pawllu Inca managed to persuade the leaders of the Mallku confederation of Charka to adopt Spanish sovereignty. At the same time, to ingratiate themselves with the new rulers, Mallku and Inca Pawllu decided to hand over to them the mines in Porco, as clearly shown by English and French researchers examining this matter on the basis of self-published, as yet unknown historical sources¹⁹.

Of course, as during the discussed earlier issue of adopting Spanish sovereignty as now, Pawllu Inca's opinion was undoubtedly crucial, not only because of his position in society, but also because of his religious functions. He was then, and until 1543, most likely a priest of Wana Kawri, one of the most important of the Tawantin Suyu deities. And Wana Kawri was especially linked with to the Inca presence in Qulla Suyu, through the shrine - oracle on the Copacabana peninsula and on the Sun Island on Lake Titicaca. As mentioned in another place²⁰, this sanctuary, founded on the orders of Tupa Inca Yupanki, was conceived as a kind of counterweight to the Cuzco sanctuaries and their priests. That is why Inca gave their control to the so-called Sucusu panaca (i.e. Royal lineage founded by Wira Qucha Inca), which was in opposition to a certain part of the Cuzco «establishment» and at the same time associated with the cult figure of the very Wana Kawri. Thanks to these particular socio-religious-territorial associations, this deity could even act as «ambassador» for imperial deities or even the local Inca «hegemon», at least before the Qulla Suyu wak'a. This hypothesis stems logically from the practice of «reconfirmation» existing in the Inca Tawantin Suyu. It would take place in one of the imperial oracles, to which the local wak' was brought to go through «verification»:

«Inca (...), conferred in this matter with his oracle (i.e. imperial deity residing in it - MZ), which spoke to him, and with the wak' just brought in. If the wak' answered (the Inca's questions), Inca would say it is good, and that they may worship it and put it in the place of cult (...) and advised it to be carried to the place, from where it was taken» (Álvarez 1998 [1588]: 74).

Taking into account the above-mentioned facts and that Qaraqaras and Charkas were conquered by Tupa Inca Yupanki, it is highly likely that «reconfirmation» of wak'a Tata Purqu took place in Copacabana, in the shrine-oracle founded by the very same leader, in the presence of Sucusu panaca priests. Thus then Pawllu Inca - not only associated with Inca royalty overseeing the shrine in Copacabana (among others via marriage, he took a wife from there) but also holding the position of Wana Kawri's priest - had no doubt enough authority to persuade Mallku to consent to revealing the secret of the mine to the Bearded Ones.

It was characteristic however, that, although Mallku betrayed the site of the ore deposits, they did not reveal the location of the guardian-deity wak'a Porco (Tata Purqu). The Indians moved it secretly, together with the other wak' near to the town

of Caltama, where they worshipped it until its discovery by a Spanish priest in the 1570s. (Platt *et al.* 2006: 135)

But let us return to the year 1539, and try to answer the question as to why the Mallku decided not to reveal the location of well-known to them deposits in Potosi, much richer than those of Porco? And why did Pawllu Inqa himself not do so? The British and French researchers mentioned earlier suggest that this may be the result of the following calculation: when the Manqu Inqa rule in Charkas was overthrown, Mallku from Charka and Qaraqara, and Inqa Pawllu decided to disclose the mines in Porco, counting on some reward from the Spaniards. The Mallku speak openly of this in a document cited by researchers, «Memorial de los Mallku». But as long as Manqu Inqa still put up resistance in Vilcabamba, it was not appropriate to reveal «the greatest treasure in the world», i.e. the mine (and Wak'a) in Potosi (Platt *et al.* 2006: 121-122).

It may be that the decision was also influenced by the less-than-encouraging reaction of the Spaniards, who offered no special privileges to those who showed them the mines in Porco (and other deposits). This represented a flagrant violation of the Andean rule of reciprocity, which was the basis for all subject-sovereign relations. Because the gift that Mallku Kuysara got in return, although perhaps prestigious, did not come close to the value of the disclosed riches:

«And the said Kuysara, as the greatest lord of the entire province of Charkas in the settlement of Chuquisaca told and revealed to the said Hernando Pizarro all the things the Inca possessed in the province of Charkas: some silver mines in a place (called) Porco, and also gold mines on the river Chiutamarcas²¹ and copper mines, which were in Aytacara and tin mines which were in Chayanta, and other things. Then the said Commander Hernando Pizarro and Gonzalo Pizarro showed him respect and thanked Kuysara for all this and gave him an outfit, a cape made of green damask and a shirt of green velvet, with gold tassels, laced boots, red hat, which was then worn and a large case with knives...» (Memorial ... fol. 10r in: Platt *et al.* 2006: 844).

We now know, that Kuysara did not divulge everything. One way or another, despite their differences or even open conflicts, all Indian fractions, both Cuzco and local, maintained for another five years a common silence on the subject of the Potosi mines. And, characteristically, Pawllu Inqa, too, kept the silence, even after the baptism of 1543, when it would seem, that as a nobleman, a Christian, and loyal servant of His Majesty Charles I, he should have offered his sovereign such a gift.

Maybe he was waiting for the appropriate time to use this information as an argument in subsequent negotiations with the Spanish crown, this time for the recognition of his rights as the sole heir to the Inca dynasty. However, in order to achieve the desired «bargaining position», he had to become «The One». This was

a condition *sine qua non*, since Manqu Inca also wished to use Potosi in his negotiations with Vice-king Blaco Nuñez Vela²². A solution to which of the two brothers would hold the royal negotiating asset became the necessity of the moment. And this moment, as shown earlier, seemed to be the best possible.

It is not therefore an accident, that barely had the news of the death of Manqu Inca reached Qullasuyu, two well-bred Indians reveal to the Spaniards the carefully hidden over the years secret of the Potosi mines. One of these «explorers» is Challku²³, connected to Challku Inca Yupankim, former governor of Qullasuyu and Pawllu Inca's faithful ally²⁴.

However, not everything went according to this, as it seems, meticulously prepared plan. Confusion caused by a more than two-year-long Gonzalo Pizarro rebellion, with which Pawllu Inca allied himself (though at the same time secretly supporting the other side, i.e. the royalists), did not allow him to properly play the Potosi hand. And although he was able to easily ingratiate himself with the royal camp which was led by Pedro de la Gasca, the opportunity to benefit from disclosure of the mines already eluded him – the deposits were distributed among the Spaniards and their intensive exploitation was beginning. An attempt to take over control of Vilcabamba and to persuade the «Regency board», governing on behalf of the minor sons of Manqu Inca, to recognize Pawllu Inca's sovereignty and, at a later stage, subordination to the Crown, failed. Inca Pawllu even acted on behalf of the new authorities before the Vice-king of Vilcabamba; he returned ill from one such trip, in early 1549, and never recovered. Was this an unfortunate accident or maybe someone's revenge for the death of Inca Manqu? This we will never know.

2. Vanquished winners

Don Cristobal Pawllu Inkill Tupa Inca outlived his brother-rival by barely a few years - when he was dying, in May 1549 in his palace in Cuzco, he was already the last of the four allies, who fifteen years earlier, in July 1534, feted in Cuzco their joint victory over the Ataw Walpa armies. He could at least have the satisfaction that, although he was dying prematurely, it was in his own bed - the remaining three partners departed from this world violent deaths: Manqu Inca as described above, Diego de Almagro «El Viejo» slain on 8 July 1538 in Cuzco, on the orders of Hernando Pizarro (but with the tacit approval of his brother, Francisco), Francisco Pizarro on 26 June 1541 in Lima, at the hand of assassins led by Diego de Almagro «El Mozo». Fate did not spare the other Pizarro brothers - beside the murdered Francisco, Juan died during the siege of Cuzco in May 1536, and Gonzalo, also in the same place, on 9 April 1548, but on a scaffold, as a rebel - the last one, Hernando, spent time in a Spanish prison.

Did Pawllu have other reasons to be pleased? Certainly, simply because he had proved to be a smarter politician than all of his, both Spanish as Indian, part-

ners and/or enemies, as attested to by the fact that in the course of these fifteen years, he managed to several times change allegiances and always come up on top, even when his current allies met with disaster, as in the case of Diego de Almagro «El Viejo», or later Gonzalo Pizarro²⁵.

Pawllu Inqa was, therefore, the last of the four who united in 1534 to fight for Tawantin Suyu, and, you could say, using today's terminology, raked in quite a pool: he received a title and a crest from the King of Spain, large estates, granted to him on various occasions by successive partners, he was able to «legalize» a nobleman's status for this numerous out-of-wedlock descendants. As for his «rightful» son, Don Carlos, the road to fame and glory, even at the court of Spain, seemed to lay open. Pawllu Inqa could not have foreseen that such a promising career will already end with his grandson, Don Melchior Carlos Inca, who squanders his grandfather's and father's property and, leaving no male heirs, leads to the end of the lineage. And the only line of descendants of the Tawantin Suyu rulers, recognized as legitimate even by the Spanish authorities, will be the one began by his brother-rival: Manqu Inqa.

Looking at all of this from the perspective of close to five hundred years that have passed since the events described above, one thing seems obvious - if at some point, someone has the idea of commemorating the conquest of Tawantin Suyu (though, to be honest, fewer and fewer seem willing...) with a new monument, such a monument should feature two figures: Marquis Francisco Pizarro and Don Cristobal Pawllu Inkill Tupa Inqa. The question remains, whether Pawllu Inqa's contribution should be considered a betrayal, or the final, Pyrrhic victory of the Inca school of diplomacy and political intrigue.

Notas

- ¹ Translated from Polish by Dorota Kozinska. This text is part of a larger publication by the Author, titled «The civil war or on miracles and fraternal hatred» (Szemiński and Ziółkowski i.p.).
- ² Titu Cusi didn't know how to write, his report was dictated through a translator – compare Titu Cusi 1989: 41
- ³ That is, the participants in the Diego de Almagro «El Mozo» rebellion in the years 1541 – 1542. Following his defeat in the battle with the royal army under Chupas on September 16, 1542, Diego Mendez and his companions took refuge at the court of Mankhu Inka in Vilcabamba, for they had been sentenced in absentia to death for the rebellion against His Majesty Charles I.
- ⁴ This somewhat fantastic thesis is proposed by Lopez de Gomara and repeated after him by Inca Garcilaso de la Vega – compare Hemming 1982: 331.
- ⁵ Alonso de Toro was pointed out as the instigator of the attack by chronicler Fernando de Montesinos, and based on the information he gathered, by researchers such as R. Porras Barremechea and Edmundo Guillén Guillén (Guillén 1974: 102, 1977, 1981, 1984). However, in light of the information closest to the time of these events, particularly information found in the chronicle of Betanzos, this seems unlikely. Compare footnotes 11 and 12.
- ⁶ «(...) instructed and ordered Manqu Inqa Mendez to speak on his behalf with the viceroy and therefore some of his «orejones» were to accompany him, to (later) return and bring back (...) the answer with the viceroy's decision which he (Diego Mendez) was to negotiate. And when it was established, Inca (people) put Diego Mendez and the others into some hammocks, and that's how they were carried, and when they reached the plateau above Guamanga they got the news that Gonzalo Pizarro was there, and together with those from Cuzco is marching against the viceroy

(...) and when Diego Mendez and the others found this out, they decided to return here when they know how it ended, and so they came back (to Vilcabamba)» (Betanzos 1987 [1551]: pt. II, chapter 32, 302).

7 «Bollos» in the text - not exactly bread, because it is not made with yeast.

8 Literally «Negra» in Betanzos' Spanish text. But this is probably the wrong Spanish translation of the original term in quechua - «yana», meaning «black» but also «servant». It probably meant an Indian servant assigned to the Spanish by the Inca.

9 About 40 kilometers.

10 Compare the description of this feast in Ziółkowski 1997.

11 Hemming, following Porras Barrenechea, does, it is true, suggest that the possible instigator behind the assassination could be Alonso de Toro, the commander of Cuzco on behalf of Gonzalo Pizarro (Hemming 1982: 329). This view is shared by E. Guillén (Guillén 1974: 102). But it is a pretty unlikely hypothesis, because it implies that Alonso de Toro, who although a proficient soldier was far from a diplomat, would have to have an extremely good understanding of court cases in Vilcabamba. Question: from where? What's more, his rank and importance were too low for him to give any reliable guarantees of support in such a delicate matter as obtaining forgiveness from the King for an overt armed rebellion against a royal governor - do not forget, that Diego Mendez and his companions took part in the battle of Chupas on the side of the rebel, Diego de Almagro «El Mozo». The case, legally, was tricky and that's why they preferred exile in Vilcabamba to awaiting the verdict imprisoned in Cuzco. Finally, the last issue, somewhat disqualifying the possibility of conspiratorial participation of Alfonso de Toro (though it does not exclude his involvement with the conspiracy, but as a partner, not instigator) - according to Betanzos, the Métis-messenger who brought the letter to Vilcabamba claimed that he is running from Gonzalo Pizarro's people (see above). He, therefore, must have had some references from someone in Cuzco, convincing enough for the Inca guards controlling the roads to Vilcabamba, to have any chance of reaching the person of Manqu Inqa. The simple statement that he «is fleeing from Christians» certainly would not be enough, and it is unlikely that such a «recommendation» could be a reference to Alonso de Toro ... «The person recommending» had to have been somebody from the circle of Cuzco Inca nobility since that same messenger openly urged the Inca to attack Cuzco. And here comes the question of time - the attack probably took place shortly after Gonzalo Pizarro set out for Lima, and when the case of viceroy Blasco Núñez Vela had not yet been settled. Let us remember, that the latter had been demoted, arrested and put onboard a ship bound for Panama, on September 18, 1544, and Pizarro marched triumphantly to Lima. Of course, there is another possibility, that the attack occurred at the beginning of 1545, when Alonso de Toro was already officially appointed the governor of Cuzco on behalf of Gonzalo Pizarro.

12 In any case, not independently, without the help of someone from the Inca elite - see previous footnote.

13 Since the assassins planned to escape from Vilcabamba to the land administered by the Crown, they had to have a guarantee that they will not immediately be imprisoned and executed - see previous footnote.

14 Vicente de Valverde's letter to the King, March 20, 1539, quoted by Hemming 1982: 303.

15 Compare Hemming 1982: 306 -307.

16 The reasons for the Spaniards hiding the Potosi deposits and the circumstances in which they were, finally, disclosed, are describe in detail by Tristan Platt and Pablo Quisbert, on the basis of previously unknown documents (Platt and Quisbert 2007).

17 A detailed analysis of this event is published in another place - Ziółkowski 1985, 1994.

18 This issue was discussed in the paper: M. Ziółkowski «La Wak'a, el Inqa y el kuraka: apuntes en torno a la Waka de Porco» presented at the panel «Mallkus, Inkas and Kings; Recent Developments in Andean Ethnohistory», Institute for the Study of the Americas, London, 2007

19 It primarily concerns the entire collection of documents comprising the reports by the Indian participants of these events, especially Mallku from the Qaraqara - Charka confederation. These documents show the Indian version of the events, including many facts not found in the Spaniards' reports. In this particular case, it concerns the reasons why the Indians decided to reveal the mines in Porco (Platt *et al.* 2006: 121-122).

20 Compare Ziółkowski 1997.

- ²¹ It speaks of the place of golden sand leaching, near Pocoata – see map 1.
- ²² This is demonstrated on the basis of newly discovered documents by Tristan Platt and Pablo Quisbert (Platt and Quisbert 2007) I do not agree, however, with the thesis of these two researchers that Pawllu Inqa and Manqu Inqa acted on Potosi in agreement (Platt and Quisbert 2007). Compare footnotes 22 and 23.
- ²³ Perhaps this was Baltasar Challco, son of Challku InqaYupanki, known from other sources (Platt and Quisbert 2007)
- ²⁴ Remember that Challku Inqa Yupanki was killed on the orders of Manqu Inqa precisely for his cooperation with the Spaniards and Pawllu Inqa. It is rather unlikely that a relative (son?) of the slain man agreed to act in concert with Manqu Inqa – compare footnotes 21 and 22.
- ²⁵ As mentioned, Pawllu Inqa took part in the Battle of Las Salinas (April 6, 1538) on the side of Diego de Almagro El Viejo, who was defeated in it and soon after was killed on the order of Hernando Pizarro. On the other hand, Pawllu Inqa quickly went over to the side of the victorious Pizarro brothers. He just as easily gained the favour first of Governor Cristobal Vaca de Castro after the battle of Chupas or Pedro de la Gasca, following the defeat of Gonzalo Pizarro.

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